incarceration." In only twenty-six of these cases were jail sentences actually served by offenders.' 2 Significantly, of the twenty-six cases in which antitrust offenders served time, twenty-two cases involved trade restraints which were vitiated with racketeering activity or violence or were labor oriented. ' 3 In other words, in the first seventy-nine years of Sherman Act enforcement, judges imposed jail sentences against individuals engaging in "pure" restraints of trade 4 in only four cases.
15
Although sentences in Sherman Act cases historically have been lenient, it is difficult to pinpoint reasons for the leniency. One reason may be the Sherman Act itself. The Sherman Act, particularly section one,' 6 broadly describes the conduct it condemns. The Act forbids all monopolies and attempts to monopolize as well as all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, but nowhere attempts to define or delimit these concepts.' 7 Not surprisingly, the Act has been condemned, both by commentatorss and by courts,' 9 as being too vague to support criminal convictions. One commentator has described the Sherman Act as:
vague in the scope of conduct proscribed, vague in the legal standard used to evaluate a course of action, and vague in the quantum and quality of " Id. 12Id . See also Flynn, supra note 5, at 1305-06.
Posner, supra note 9, at 391. 14 The language is Posner's and is meant to indicate antitrust criminal cases in which the Justice Department brought only Sherman Act charges. See id. at 389. (1978) . is Mercurio, supra note 4, at 438 . See also Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REv. 929, 939 (1961) .
19 See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373. For cases in which state antitrust laws have been attacked as being unconstitutionally vague, see Flynn, supra note 5, at 1312 n.65.
proof necessary to prove a violation. Moreover like some statutes, and more than most statutes, the antitrust laws are in constant flux and evolution. As the national economy, marketing techniques, business policy, and a host of other factors that give impetus and direction of individual business judgments evolve, interpretation and application of the antitrust laws shift and change to keep pace.20
It is probable that the vagueness of the Sherman Act has contributed to leniency in antitrust sentencing. In some cases, the sentencingjudge himself probably believed that the Sherman Act was vague, and adjusted the sentence accordingly. In other cases, judges were probably persuaded to reduce sentence by claims of an offending businessman that the Act did not indicate to the businessman what was and was not illegal competitive conduct. Indeed, some evidence does exist which suggests that businessmen do not know the content and scope of the Sherman Act. 21 The evidence results from the controversial sentences imposed by Judge Charles B. Renfrew in United States v. Blankenheim.
2 2 In Blankenheim, five corporate executives in the paper label industry were convicted of price fixing. Each executive was sentence4 by Judge Renfrew to make twelve oral presentations to different business and civic groups about his participation in the price fixing conspiracy. At each presentation, audience members were given a questionnaire on antitrust sentencing. One of the questions inquired about the respondent's knowledge of the antitrust laws. Although all but one of the ninety-nine respondents knew that price fixing is illegal, many respondents had, in the words of Judge Renfrew, "great difficulty relating the general requirements of the antitrust laws to specific factual contexts."2 The vagueness of the Sherman Act, however, has been exaggerated. Key Sherman Act concepts, which were left undefined at the time of the Act's passage, are no longer meaningless. The task of infusing meaning into the sweeping, imprecise text of the Sherman Act was left by Congress to the courts, and the courts diligently have gone about accomplishing the task. "Restraint of trade," for example, was defined in 1911 in the landmark Standard Oil case; 2"conspiracy" was interpreted in United States v. American Tobacco;a2 and "monopolize or attempt to monopolize" was explained by Judge Learned Hand in the famous Alcoa case.
6
Moreover, the Sherman Act withstood constitutional attack on vagueness grounds in Nash v. United States. 2 7 In Nash, two corporations and six individuals were charged with monopolization of and conspiracy to restrain trade in the sale of turpentine in interstate and foreign commerce. The defendants, among other anticompetitive conduct, manipulated the market for turpentine and engaged in coercion of brokers and consumers of turpentine. At trial, five individuals were found guilty, one individual was found not guilty, and no judgment was entered concerning the two corporate defendants. The convicted parties appealed, claiming that the Sherman Act, as interpreted in Standard Oil28 was unconstitutionally vague. In a brief seven-page opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the Act. A third reason why the vagueness criticism of the Sherman Act is exaggerated is the policy of the Justice Department to bring criminal charges against only well-defined types of trade restraints.a2 The policy of the Justice Department with respect to criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act has been described as follows:
In general, the following types of offenses are prosecuted criminally: (1) price fixing; (2) other violations of the Sherman Act where there is proof of a specific intent to restrain trade or monopolize; (3) a less easily defined category of cases which might generally be described as involving proof of use of predatory practices (boycotts, for example) to accomplish the objective of the combination or con- ' Ultimately, the vagueness attack against the Sherman Act is unwarranted, and lenient antitrust sentencing because of it is unjustified. If anything, the sweeping text of the Act should be applauded, rather than disparaged. Although the courts have infused key Sherman Act concepts with widelyaccepted and well-understood meaning, the broad language of the Act has imbued it with a capacity to grow and meet new economic conditions and situations. 36 In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, the Act is written with a "generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." 3 7 The favorable product of judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act, then, is an Act which has proven to be stable in meaning, but which has also proved to be workable in practice.
Another possible explanation for lenient sentencing in Sherman Act cases is the closeness of the Sherman Act to the common law. Although the Sherman Act was a product of populist fervor which spread across the United States in the late 19th century,3 the Act is basically a child of the common law. Besides its substantive similarity to the common law trade tort of unfair competition,s the Sherman Act, according to Senator Sherman, was not designed to "announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well-recognized principles of the common law."
40
In early cases, judges stressed the common law features of the Sherman Act. The paramount case interpreting the Sherman Act in terms of the common law is Standard Oil, in which the Supreme Court read the Act to condemn only "unreasonable" or "undue" restraints of trade.
4 ' Speaking for the majority in Standard Oil, Chief Justice White stated that the concepts contained in the Sherman Act, "at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption" of the Act. 43 The Addyston case contains probably the most exhaustive judicial treatment of the relationship of the Sherman Act to the common law. In Addyston, Taft extensively discussed the common law of trade restraints before finally concluding that Congress intended the Act to be interpreted in light of common law principles." Because of the common law character of the Sherman Act, judges, particularly in early cases, probably saw the Act as a codification of common law trade tort principles 45 and thus more a civil than criminal piece of legislation. Judges consequently may have been reluctant to impose strong sentences in Sherman Act criminal cases. They left enforcement of the Act to injured private parties willing to sue for treble damages in civil actions, thereby establishing a precedent of leniency which would be followed by later judges, even after the tort and common law flavor of the Act dwindled and the Act took on the public and regulatory character which marks it today. Lenient sentencing based on the position that the Sherman Act is basically a codified tort action ignores fundamental Sherman Act policy objectives. Perhaps the most important of these objectives is economic efficiency; by promoting competition, the Sherman Act improves resource allocation and adds to the economic well-being of the consuming public. 46 The Act also serves populist goals. "It disperses wealth; limits business size; broadens entrepreneurial opportunities; and substitutes the impersonal forces of the market place for the economic power of private individuals or groups to exploit or coerce those with whom they deal.", 4 7 More recently, the Sherman Act has been touted as an important tool for fighting inflation.
48
Achievement of these Sherman Act policy objectives comes through effective deterrence of wouldbe offenders of the Sherman Act. 49 The possibility of civil actions for treble damages may in part serve as a deterrent. However, private litigants usually face a number of hurdles which severely limit the deterrence power of treble damage suits. These hurdles include the time and labor-consuming process of discovery, high attorney's fees, the prospect of drawn-out litigation, difficulty in proving damages, and often the enormous size, resources, and power of the defendant. against offenders, therefore, fail to carry out the fundamental policies which underlie the Act. Judges also may have imposed lenient sentences in Sherman Act cases because they saw sentencing under the Act in terms of the philosophy of competition law in general. The Sherman Act is part of a large body of competition law, including the Clayton Act s ' and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 as well as a pantheon of state and federal regulation of utilities and business.
5 3 The basic philosophy of this body of law, best exemplified by utility regulation, is to guide or shape the behavior of business. Within this prospective regulation-oriented milieu, judges probably lost sight of the purpose of Sherman Act sentencing, which is to punish past misconduct and hopefully to deter misconduct in the future.54 Judges consequently imposed lenient fines in Sherman Act cases to remind the offending businessman that his past misconduct was frowned upon and depended upon carefully drawn consent decrees 5 to ensure proper conduct in the future.
Judges have probably also imposed lenient sentences against Sherman Act offenders on the basis that antitrust offenses are not sufficiently morally serious to warrant harsher sentences.56 Antitrust § § 61-65 (1977 REV. 296 (1977) .
s6For a thorough discussion on the moral aspect of antitrust crime, see Flynn, supra note 5, at 1315-23. crime has rarely been seen as being as morally serious as other crime. In the Renfrew study, for example, respondents when asked whether antitrust violations were more or less stigmatizing or socially disgraceful than embezzlement, bribery of a public official, tax evasion, bank robbery, and consumer fraud, generally replied that antitrust violations were less stigmatizing. 5 7 The attitude that antitrust violations are not morally serious derives from the nature of the conduct the Sherman Act regulates. The Sherman Act, broadly speaking, regulates pursuit of selfinterest in business. Short of monopoly or attempt to monopolize, the Act approves pursuit of interest by individual businessmen and disapproves of it L when engaged in with competitors. The line the Sherman Act draws between individual pursuit of interest and collective pursuit is more a legal line than a moral one, since there is nothing intrinsically immoral about pursuit of interest in business. As such, competitive conduct which falls on the wrong side of the line may earn a degree of moral opprobrium because it is in fact a violation of the law, but the conduct, in the eyes of many sentencing judges, probably lacks sufficient moral seriousness to warrant strict sentencing.
It should be noted, however, that the moral aspect of Sherman Act offenses is not the basis upon which judges should impose sentence in Sherman Act cases. With crimes such as rape or murder, which bear a heavy stamp of moral opprobrium, the judge may appropriately consider the moral aspect of the crime in setting sentence. With antitrust violations, however, the goal of sentencing is general deterrence; that is, to impose sentences sufficient to deter future violators.' 8 Judges may consciously or unconsciously equate severity of sentence with the moral seriousness of the offense, reserving harsh sentences for offenders engaging in morally serious crimes. To the extent that judges have done so in Sherman Act cases, they have probably been unfaithful to the goal of general deterrence. Lenient sentencing based on the minimal moral seriousness of Sherman Act violations also ignores the enormous social implications of antitrust crime. Simply in terms of dollars and cents, the implications of ineffective sentencing in Sherman Act cases are enormous. The impact of antitrust crime is not limited to one locality and a few persons, but is felt in scores of markets and in the pocket books of thousands of consumers. 59 Economic efficiency is also reduced by lenient sentencing because competitors are under no incentive not to monopolize or to engage in restraints of trade. Besides monetary and economic costs, there are also sociopolitical costs to ineffective sentencing. One of the more important of these sociopolitical costs is loss of economic freedom of choice. "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." ' 6 Another factor contributing to lenient sentencing in Sherman Act cases is the white collar background of the offender. To sum up, judges historically have been reluctant to incarcerate Sherman Act offenders and have been equally unwilling to impose stiff fines in Sherman Act cases. Several factors, including the broad language and common-law origins of the Act, the philosophy of regulation implicit in competition law in general, the relative morality of Sherman Act violations, the character and record of Sherman Act offenders, and the lack of congressional and administrative pressure for strict sentencing, may have contributed to judicial lenience in sentencing Sherman Act violators. However, most of these explanations for leniency in Sherman Act sentencing either lack merit, have been exaggerated in importance, or obscure more important criminal suits have not been counted. See CCH TRADE REO. REP., supra note 16. Totals, 1971-79 As the following study of Sherman Act sentencing during the 1970s should indicate, the pattern of leniency which historically has existed in antitrust sentencing ended in the 1970s. Data for the study, which covers the years from 1971 through 1979, was gathered from the Blue Book68 and includes only cases involving "pure" restraints of trade. 69 To allow for better understanding of trends in antitrust sentencing during the 1970s, the data has been broken down into three general categories: 1) misdemeanor antitrust cases, 1971-75, 2) misdemeanor cases, 1976-79, and 3) felony cases. Table 1 provides information on the frequency with which Sherman Act offenders were sentenced during the 1970s. Between 1971 and 1979, 431 individuals were subject to sentence for Sherman Act violations; 405 of these persons (or 94.0%) ultimately served some sentence. A close look at the material reveals that sentencing became stricter in the latter years of the 1970s. Although the percentage of individuals serving sentence in misdemeanor cases from 1971 through 1975 is a respectable 87.7%, the sentencing performance of courts in the last four years of the decade was outstanding. Of 227 persons subject to sentence in misdemeanor and felony cases from 1976 through 1979, 226 (or 99.6%) served some sentence. Nota-68 CCH TRADE REG. REP., supra note 16. 69 In other words, the study does not consider cases in which antitrust charges are coupled with charges of racketeering, perjury or mail fraud. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. bly, all fifty-nine felony defendants subject to sentence incurred some penalty. In addition to imposing more sentences against Sherman Act offenders in the 1970s, courts showed an increasing willingness to incarcerate violators. In table 2, the number of individuals incarcerated for violating the Sherman Act is compared with the number of individuals subject to sentence. From 1971 From through 1975 .7% of Sherman Act offenders were incarcerated, a remarkable statistic when compared to the frequency with whichjudges imposed jail sentences against Sherman Act defendants prior to 1971.70 Yet, in antitrust cases from 1976 through 1979, the rate at which offenders were incarcerated doubled, increasing from 12.7% to 25.1%. In misdemeanor cases for 1976 through 1979, the percentage of offenders spending time in jail reached 20.8%. In addition, 37.3% of felony defendants served jail time, a rate of incarceration three times that for offenders in misdemeanor cases from 1971 through 1975.
The percentage ofjudges imposing jail sentences against Sherman Act offenders also increased dur- ing the 1970s. Although judges sitting on Sherman Act cases demonstrated an increasing willingness to use the jail sentence against offenders, they did not behave predictably in setting the term to be served. Table  4 presents data on the length of sentence imposed in Sherman Act cases during 1971 through 1979. As table 4 indicates, the length of sentence imposed against Sherman Act offenders fluctuated during the 1970s. In misdemeanor cases from 1971 through 1975, twenty-six individuals served a total of 1495 days in jail for an average sentence of fiftyeight days. The average sentence for the twentytwo felony defendants serving time was a comparable fifty-nine days. However, the thirty-five defendants serving time in misdemeanor cases from 1976 through 1979 spent only 759 days in jail, an average sentence of twenty-two days. Thus, despite the fact that judges were increasingly willing to incarcerate Sherman Act defendants, the material in table 4 indicates that there still was considerable disagreement among judges as to the appropriate jail term individuals should serve for Sherman Act violations. Although courts imposed the fine sentence in a fairly consistent fashion during the 1970s, they did not avoid imposing harsher fines. As table 6 indicates, the average fine imposed against Sherman Act offenders increased substantially during the 1970s. In misdemeanor cases from 1971 through 1976, 176 individuals were assessed fines cumulating $1,479,500, for an average sentence of $8,400. The increase in use of the jail and fine sentence in the latter years of the 1970s is attributable, however, to felony cases where 32.1% of defendants served both a jail and fine sentence. As table 8 indicates, judges in the 1970s also toughened fine sentences for corporations violating the Sherman Act. In misdemeanor cases from 1971 through 1979, for example, 518 corporate offenders suffered an average penalty of $25,700. In felony cases, in contrast, the average sentence for corporate offenders was $174,300.
Although it is difficult to establish with certainty why Sherman Act sentencing toughened during the 1970s, it is still possible to point to factors which reasonably can be said to have had some influence on judges' sentencing in Sherman Act cases. Passage of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, for example, was probably the most important factor contributing to stricter antitrust sentencing during the 1970s. Congress passed the Procedures and Penalties Act in 1974.
7 ' The Procedures and Penalties Act, besides making important changes in procedures for using consent decrees in antitrust cases, 72 increased the ceiling on fines for corporate offenders from $50,000 to $1,000,000 and for individuals from $50,000 to $100,000, and raised the maximum jail term for individuals from one to three years. In addition to these penalty increases, the Procedures and Penalties Act elevated the status of Sherman Act violations from misdemeanor to felony. Several commentators have criticized elevating Sherman Act violations to felony status, principally on the ground that the Sherman Act is too imprecise to brand as felons businessmen violating the Act. 73 The criticism, however, is unwarranted, since the Justice Department in felony cases has carefully followed its longstanding policy of only seeking criminal charges against individuals engaging in well-defined types of trade restraints, such as price fixing.
74
Elevating Sherman Act offenses to felony status also has been criticized on deterrence grounds. At least one commentator has argued that felony status would not spur judges sitting on Sherman Act cases to impose stricter sentences, rather it would, if anything, provoke judges to sentence less harshly than in the past. 75 The contention appears to be
